Limits of far-right mobilization in Poland: incumbency, threat direction and timing

This article explains why Poland’s 2022–2023 reception of millions of Ukrainian refugees did not trigger a renewed far-right mobilization. I argue that refugee inflows strengthen the far right only when three mechanisms align: liberal incumbency, refugee securitization, and timely solidarity fatigue. In Poland in 2023, all three misaligned. The right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) government could not shift blame to liberals; Russia, not refugees, dominated the threat narrative; and public fatigue emerged too weakly and too late to mobilize electorally. Using Polish opinion data, party discourse, and media coverage, the study reconstructs how securitization was redirected outward and the far-right mobilization did not occur even with the mass influx of refugees. The findings extend existing theories by showing that far-right mobilization depends not merely on cultural or economic grievance but on incumbency, threat direction, and timing.